Assessing South Africa's "quiet diplomacy" towards Zimbabwe : strengths and weaknesses. by Mkhize, Mbekezeli Comfort.
Assessing South Africa's "Quiet Diplomacy" Towards 
Zimbabwe: Strengths and Weaknesses 
By 
Mbekezeli Comfort Mkhize 
201509054 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Social Science in the School of Politics, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg 
July 2008 




List of Abbreviations v 
Chapter One: Introduction Pg 1 
Chapter Two: Key Features of South African Foreign Policy Since 1994 
and the Approach to Zimbabwean Crisis Pgl7 
Chapter Three: Strengths of "Quiet Diplomacy" Pg31 
Chapter Four: Weaknesses of "Quiet Diplomacy" Pg38 




I, B\A^i.^.^fJ..... declare that 
(i) The research reported in this dissertation, except where otherwise 
indicated, is my original work. 
(ii) This dissertation/thesis has not been submitted for any degree or 
examination at any other university 
(iii) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, 
graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being 
sourced from other persons. 
(iv) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless 
specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where 
other written sources have been quoted, then: 
(a) their words have been re-written but the general information 
attributed to them has been referenced; 
(b) where their exact words have been used, their writing has been 
placed inside quotations marks, and referenced. 
(v) Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am an author, co-
author or editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the publication was 
actually written by myself alone and have fully referenced such publications 
(vi) This dissertation/thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied 
and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source 
being detailed in the dissertation and in the References sections. 
Signed: 
7W 
Submitted in partial (for coursework) fulfilment of the requirements of 
the degree of Masters in Social Science in the School of Politics, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg. 
As the candidate's Supervisor I have approved this dissertation/thesis 
for submission 




The research project begins with the land reform programme in Zimbabwe between 
2000 and 2008. Under colonialism Britain took most arable land from the indigenous 
Zimbabweans and gave it to the white (minority) settler population. The research 
attempts to look at how, after independence, President Robert Mugabe has handled 
the issue of land in an effort to reverse this situation. Some of the consequences of 
land reform include the collapse of the economy, political instability and social 
incoherence. Together, these consequences have led to the 'crisis' to describe social 
and political life in Zimbabwe. Most importantly, the project analyses South Africa's 
approach in dealing with this 'crisis'. Therefore, South Africa's approach has become 
the key subject upon which this project will be focused. 
Initially, the approach that was adopted and implemented by South African 
government towards Zimbabwe was termed "Quiet Diplomacy". The reasons for this 
approach are several. Firstly, this approach was one way of respecting the sovereignty 
of Zimbabwe. In other words, this was an attempt to honour and respect the internal 
affairs of Zimbabwe. Secondly, Thabo Mbeki's government was of the view that 
using economic muscle to sanction Zimbabwe would worsen the situation because 
Zimbabwe is dependent on South Africa in terms of electricity supply and other 
resources. However, as Quiet Diplomacy appeared to be ineffectual in halting 
Zimbabwe's slide into further disarray, much criticism has been generated. Critics 
state that the approach is not working, and it has made the situation worse in 
Zimbabwe. 
In addition, the study, therefore, has hypothesised that: "Quiet Diplomacy" is not a 
viable approach to deal with the Zimbabwean crisis. In making this claim, the study 
observes both the strengths and weaknesses of "quiet diplomacy". Finally, the study 
also seeks to make possible options (other than quiet diplomacy) that South African 
government should have considered. In the end, the study intends to make 
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Zimbabwe (formerly known as Rhodesia) is a country that has had two distinct and 
competing political dispensations, namely, colonialism (prior to 1980) and 
independence (after 1980). Basically, it was Britain that colonised the territory that 
later became Zimbabwe, beginning in the 1890s and ending following a war of 
liberation from settler governance in 1980. This imperial conquest was largely aimed 
at acquiring and having control over land, resources, and including the change of 
culture. For instance, Mungazi argued that British colonisation of Zimbabwe, and 
indeed, other countries in Africa, constituted both cultural invasion and an act of 
violence . Mungazi insisted that colonial domination, by its very nature, is violent . 
Thus under colonial rule, the Africans of Southern Africa were particularly unable to 
participate in the government of the colony. According to Campbell, colonialism was 
anti-democratic and militaristic . In pre-independence Zimbabwe, the freedom of the 
people was sharply reduced by the colonial state, which was effectively organised to 
ensure exploitation of the majority of the people. Of all the possible adverse effects 
that colonialism had on African countries, Mungazi was of the opinion that there were 
two significant effects, namely, a group of colonizers create an environment from 
which it seeks to reduce invaded to a level of political domination, and the second is 
that it utilizes the view of its own superiority to impose its own culture on the 
' Mungazi, D.A (1992) Colonial Policy and Conflict in Zimbabwe A Study of Cultures in Collision, 
1890-1979, New York: Crane Russak, p.l 1 
2 Ibid 
3 Campbell, H (2003), Reclaiming Zimbabwe The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation, 
Johannesburg: David Phillip Publishers, p.299 
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invaded4. Further, Mamdani cited by Alexander argued that colonial rule created a 
'bifurcated state' that distinguished between citizens on the one hand and subjects on 
other5. Post-colonial states seem to have succeeded in de-racialising but not 
democratising, instead reifying the authoritarian characteristics of indirect rule in a 
variety of ways6. According to Mahmood Mamdani, "this, not economic inequity, was 
colonialism's most dangerous legacy, and it stands as the key obstacle to 
democratisation, political stability, and an accountable state" . 
In terms of the economic system, Zimbabwe was a tremendously rich country in 
agriculture before settler colonialism came in8. During colonialism, the Rhodesian 
economy was an enclave economy where agricultural production was never 
competitive in the classical sense of capitalist competition. Under colonialism, the 
progress made in economic development mostly benefited the members of the settler 
class while the majority of the population remained exploited . Socially, the 
Rhodesian state had improved the standard of living at the expense of majority of the 
people. The native Zimbabweans used to have a room for cultural, spiritual, and 
material wealth before the arrival of settler colonialism. 
In regard to transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, the series of struggles had paved 
way for independence. Most importantly, it was "the winds of change" of post-
colonial independence in Malawi (Nyasaland), and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), that 
prompted the settlers in Zimbabwe led by Ian Smith to make a Unilateral Declaration 
4Mungazi, D.A, p. 11 
5 Alexander, J. (2006) The Unsettled Land State-making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-
2003, Oxford: James Currey, p.2 
6 Ibid 
7 Mamdani, M. cited by Alexander, J. p.2 
8Mungazi, D.A, p. 11 
9 Ibid, p.95 
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of Independence (UDI) in 1965. The intention of this was to prevent the British 
government from handing power to the indigenous majority over whom the settlers 
ruled, thus forestalling national independence10. Smith continually claimed that there 
would be no majority rule during his lifetime. As a result, the armed struggle was 
started in 196611. 
In essence, the freedom fighters were represented by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU), and Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe African People's 
Union (ZAPU). Together, they established an alliance known as Patriotic Front (PF) 
in 1979. Thus, it was this Patriotic Front which was pressured to sign the Lancaster 
House Agreement in London on 21 December 1979 . Apparently, this was an attempt 
to achieve Zimbabwe's political independence. In that conference, it was agreed that 
all parties must campaign peacefully and without intimidation that they must 
renounce the use of force, and accept the outcomes of the election13. Thus, the signing 
of the Lancaster House Agreement had assured a transition from Rhodesia to 
Zimbabwe. Indeed, a new and absolutely unique dispensation emerged in 1980 when 
the burden of leadership was conferred upon Robert Mugabe (newly elected 
President). From 1980 onwards, Zimbabwe began to be recognised internationally as 
an independent state. Peron noted some overwhelming advances after independence 
with regard to children in school, for example, the number of children in school 
increased from 820 000 to 2,2 million14. This was partly attributed to Mugabe's 
initiative of increasing public spending from about 40 per cent of Gross Domestic 
luIbid, p.24 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid, p.22 
13 Ibid 
14 Peron, J. (2000), Zimbabwe The Death of a Dream, Johannesburg: Amagi Books, p.2-3 
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Product (GDP) in 1980-81 to 47 per cent in 1987-8815. In post-independence 
Zimbabwe, lot of money was also being pumped into health services. However, the 
colonial legacy (particularly ownership of the land) continued to manifest itself. As 
such, the legacy was especially more noticeable in terms of politics and the economy 
of the country which did not change. For instance, agriculture continued to dominate. 
Hence, in the 1960s whites Zimbabweans had owned 70 percent of the land , and 
despite the change in government, "white Zimbabweans own 75 per cent of most 
productive and arable land in the 1990s17. The change in ownership of the land did not 
prevail due in part to the fact that blacks were not incapacitated to control. The Land 
Reform programme had come into being because "the Rhodesians had systematically 
stripped the country's blacks of all the best land since 1980"18. Typically, the struggle 
against Rhodesia had been fought to win back the land. Initially, a regulatory 
framework aimed largely at ensuring fair and equitable land ownership came into 
being. Most importantly, this framework was mainly an outcome of the Lancaster 
House Agreement. Originally, the agreement was solely based on "Willing buyer, 
"Willing seller principle". Hence, the Lancaster House constitution protected property 
rights for 10 years, and dictated that the 'European' land be acquired under the 
principle mentioned. In effect, the constitution guaranteed a white monopoly of 20 
seats in the 100-seat parliament for seven years19. In terms of the outcomes of the 
agreement, white farmers who were unwilling to stay in Zimbabwe would be bought 
out by funds provided by the British through the Zimbabwe government20. Actually, 
|5 Ibid 
16 Wikipeadia, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, p.2 
17 Ibid 
Meldrum, A. (2004). Where We Have Hope A Memoir of Zimbabwe, London: John Murray 
Publishers, p. 128 
Alexander, J. (2006). The Unsettled Land State-making & the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-
2003, Oxford: James Currey, p. 105 
Wikipedia, Land reform in Zimbabwe, p.2 available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land reform_in_Zimbabwe Accessed: 16 March 2007 
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Robert Mugabe's attempts to redistribute land to the indigenous Zimbabweans had 
proven to be in vain following the failure of Lancaster House Agreement. This did not 
achieve its desired outcomes (not necessarily exponential growth, but to ensure that 
the assistance was provided to those in need). However, surprisingly, in 1999 it 
became clear that the Lancaster House Agreement did not achieve suitable outcomes. 
The main reason that led to the failure of the agreement was that unfairness and 
inequity in the allocation of the land that was perpetuated by Robert Mugabe. Land 
was mostly given to his 'cronies'. Secondly, this was so because proposals were 
amended to remove those clauses and insert a new one to compulsorily acquire land 
for redistribution without compensation. Subsequently, Mugabe introduced a far more 
radical approach to deal with the issue of land. Still in 1999, Mugabe decided to write 
a new constitution which was in accordance with the aforementioned changes. For 
him, the new strategy seemed to have worked because he was able to forcibly remove 
the whites. 
Perhaps, this asymmetrical ownership of land had infuriated Robert Mugabe. Prior to 
the 1990 election, with few demonstrable benefits to show after ten years of 
independence, Mugabe maintained that: 
"It makes absolute nonsense of our history as an African country that most of 
our arable and ranching land is still in the hands of our erstwhile colonisers, 
while the majority of our peasant community still live in squatters in their 
God-given land"21 
Further, Meredith concedes that programme of land reform in the 1990s was 
implemented in a chaotic manner from the start; partly because no attempt was made 
21 Meredith, M. (20020 Robert Mugabe Power, Plunder, and Tyranny in Zimbabwe, p.121 
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to consult farmers, rural communities or even government's own agricultural 
specialists22. As far as Peron is concerned, "Mugabe has consistently and publicly said 
that any decisions he makes can not be overruled or ignored" . To make matters even 
worse, Mugabe also campaigned vigorously using land reform as the end-product of 
the June 2000 elections. Kriger asserted that in 2000 Mugabe's 20 year rule was 
conceived to be in jeopardy, and that is why he forged an alliance with the Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA)24. In essence, the War 
Veterans spearheaded the invasion and occupation of white commercial farmers25. 
This had probably instilled a sense of apprehension on the part of the opposition, and 
it also resulted in the closure of polling stations where the opposition seemed to have 
a stronghold. 
In the economic realm, the seizure of white farms has led to the deterioration of 
economic conditions in Zimbabwe" . All along, the economy of Zimbabwe has been 
based on agriculture. Campbell argues that "Zimbabwe's economy is based on 
agricultural production, a highly developed and diversified manufacturing sector and 
a very developed mining sector" . In a nutshell, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has 
predicted major fall-outs in three fronts: 
o All foreign investment would disappear 
o There would be no further money from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
22 Ibid, p.122 
23 Peron, J. (200), Zimbabwe The Death of a Dream, Johannesburg: Amagi Books, p.10 
24Kriger, N. "Zimbabwe's War Veterans and the Ruling Party: Continuities in Political Dynamics", in 
Darnolf, S, and Laakso, L. (2003). Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe From Liberation to 
Authoritarianism, New York: Palgrave MacMillan Ltd, p. 104 
25 Ibid 
26 Sachikanye, L.M. South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy: the case of Zimbabwe, p.569 available at 
www.hrscpress.ac.za 
" Campbell, H. (2003), Reclaiming Zimbabwe The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation, 
Claremont: David Philip, p.4 
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o Many farmers had mortgaged their properties, and unless they could grow and 
sell crops, they would default on their loans to the commercial banks, creating 
a financial crisis . 
Quite aside from these horrible predictions, the economy continued to be unstable. 
For example, in 2002 presidential elections, the inflation was approaching 400 %, and 
the government lacked the ability to print the new notes required29. Ultimately, many 
industries were forced to close, and agricultural production continued to decline . 
Apparently, this is attributed in part to the fact that many previously landless people 
who occupied the land for white commercial farmers had no expertise in farming. Van 
Buuren rightly points out that: 
"While the rest of the celebrated the arrival of the new millennium, 
Zimbabweans were descending into the worst economic crisis of their 
country's 20 year history"31. 
At present, the inflation is now at more than 164,900 percent . Amazingly, inflation 
in Zimbabwe is still accelerating. For instance, on a monthly basis (starting from 
March 2008) inflation rose to 36,3%, up from 30,1% the previous month . Zimbabwe 
is struggling with rising poverty, unemployment of about 80%> and chronic food and 
fuel shortages34. Inevitably, the country's economy is contracting at a dramatic rate. 
Astonishing inflationary figures have continued to reinforce this decline. 
"8 Hill, G. (2003). The Battle for Zimbabwe The Final Countdown. Cape Town: Zebra Press, p. 10 
29 Brown and Saunders (2004), "Recent History", in Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the 
Sahara, London: Europa Publications, p.1229 
30 Ibid 
31 Van Buuren, L. in Brown and Saunders (2004), Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the 
Sahara, p. 1230 
32 Central Statistical Office, Zimbabwe Inflation hits record of nearly 165,000 per cent, available at: 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gHsXPstmkHRXSCxqkPms co9AVA Accessed 19 April 2008, 
p.l 
Mail&Guardian Online, Zimbabwe inflation hits new record, p.l available at: 
http://www,mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=295321&area=breaking news/breaki... Accessed 10 
March 2008 
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In the political realm, President Robert Mugabe has adamantly remained defiant (over 
his seemingly dictatorial rule), despite growing political tensions35. Thus, for Mugabe 
and his party, the key to election victory had to be through nationwide efforts to 
intimidate voters, and as a last resort to rig the count36. In essence, political 
intimidation along with state repression has rendered the state to be conceived as 
being authoritarian in nature. Political intolerance (between ruling and opposition 
parties) continues to dominate the political debates, and the manner in which 
Zimbabwe government is seen by international community. According to Peron, this 
is caused by Mugabe's strong belief that "there is no need for other parties since 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) speaks for the 
people"37. He further points out that Mugabe regards other parties as "counter-
revolutionary" . This is despite the fact, in my view, the opposition is accused of 
stressing the need for a far more creative and constructive way of handling the land 
reform, given the unintended outcomes the reform has had on innocent Zimbabweans. 
Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the ZANU-PF coupled with thugs had begun to 
target members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Such intolerance is 
further fuelled by the arrest of some leaders of the opposition including Morgan 
Tsvangirai (leader of the MDC) . Tsvangirai has in fact survived the targets of 
assassination on more than one attempt . Campbell maintained that in the 2002 
Presidential Elections, Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition was tortured, by the 
Chan, S. (2003). Robert Mugabe A Life of Power and Violence, USA: University of Michigan Press, 
p.196 
37 Peron, J. (2000), Zimbabwe The Death of a Dream, p.7 
3Mbid 
39 Brown and Saunders, (2004) "Recent History", in Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the 
Sahara, London: Europa Publications, p.1228 
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police and beaten by 'war veterans' while the police looked on41. Technically, 
Tsvangirai was accused of having threatened to use violence to remove Mugabe from 
office42. Further, large numbers of MDC supporters felt that this was the President's 
attempt to get away with opposition in the country. 
Ideologically, Robert Mugabe endorses socialism. For Peron, Mugabe thinks that 
socialism means a state that treats its people like children and one that ignores 
individual rights in the name of "common good"43. Practically, Mugabe was first 
exposed to socialism at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa. In 1983, Mugabe 
told thousands of people that his ZANU-PF party will rule forever, and he urged them 
to make it a mammoth party and prepare it for its historic one-party State role44. Later, 
however, Zimbabwe became the centre of international attention due to massive 
violence and social upheaval that had accompanied the farm occupations and land 
invasions. Consequently, Campbell maintains that human rights groups in Zimbabwe, 
opposition forces, women's organisations, the independent media, international 
organisations dedicated to human rights, and numerous other organisations, brought to 
world attention the political violence that created enormous political and 
psychological damage to society45. 
41 Campbell, H. p.308 
42 Ibid 
43 Peron, J. (2000). P.5 
44 Ibid 
Campbell, H. (2003). Reclaiming Zimbabwe The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation, 
p.79 
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2008 Zimbabwe General Elections 
The turn of events in the 2008 elections seem to have thrown Zimbabwe into the yet 
further turmoil following the tension that the election has presented. In the 2002 
election, the MDC lost the election, and it seemed as though that they were not 
entirely content with the results. A state of uncertainty was caused by the torture and 
arrest of Tsvangirai prior to the 2002 elections46. Further, the opposition party is also 
not allowed to campaign freely without fear and pressure. According to Peron, this is 
because in Zimbabwe government owns all television and radio and has taken direct 
control of many of the newspapers47. Thus, opposition candidates and views contrary 
to those of the ruling party are not allowed on the air48. 
However, in the 2008 election, no arrests and tortures were reported prior to the 
election. The primary problem has been the inconsistency in regard to the release of 
presidential results. In fact, the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) has failed 
to release the totality of the results. Instead, it announced the results on the 
parliamentary seats, which were effectively won by Morgan Tsvangirai by 99 seats to 
97 seats of Robert Mugabe. This was the first challenge to Robert Mugabe's 28 year 
rule since independence to be beaten by a 'weak and fractured' opposition party. In 
terms of the presidential election, official results were not yet been release. However, 
supporters of the MDC claim that they have won by 60 per cent twice the total of 
Mugabes with the half of results counted. Delays in the release of results have 
reaffirmed suspicions of election rigging. This led the African National Congress 
(ANC) president Jacob Zuma to suggest that the situation in Zimbabwe is worrying 
and that the rule of law must be complied with and applied. At the annual general 
46 Campbell, H, p.308 
47 Peron, J (2000), p.l 15 
48 Ibid 
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meeting of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry South Africa in Boksburg, Zuma 
rightfully said that "we once again register our apprehension about the situation in 
Zimbabwe"49. He further argued that "the delay in the verification process and the 
release of results increases anxiety each day"50. In the process, the ANC encouraged 
Southern African Development Committee (SADC's) principles and guidelines 
governing democratic elections. 
Meanwhile, a Chinese ship carrying weapons such as rocket grenades, mortar bombs, 
tubes and millions of rounds of ammunition was caught in Durban. According to 
DailySun report, the cargo ship An Yue Jiang was carrying 3080 cases of weapons 
destined for Harare51. Responding to this event, the government Communications 
Head, Themba Maseko stated that South Africa could not stop the shipment and was 
"treading very carefully"32. But the Democratic Alliance (DA) spokesman warned 
that letting the weapons through would be "the surest sign yet that the government has 
lost the plot on Zimbabwe" . Furthermore, Zuma argued that the region can not 
afford deepening crisis in Zimbabwe, the situation is more worrying now, given the 
reported violence that has erupted in the country. In actual fact, Mugabe faces an 
unprecedented pressure following the drastic collapse of the economy, increase in the 
HIV infection rates, inflation now reaching 100 000%. Delays in the release of results 
have been criticised. The opposition party believes that delays are an attempt to keep 
Robert Mugabe in power. 
Naki, E, Sowetan Newspaper, April 17, 2008, p.5 
50 Ibid 




In response to the aforementioned plight, the South African government (under the 
leadership of President Thabo Mbeki) has opted for the so-called 'Quiet Diplomacy'-
as a policy approach to remedy the volatile situation in Zimbabwe. Quiet Diplomacy 
is mainly considered as a softly-softly approach partly because it is based solely on 
dialogue and because it all happens behind closed doors. According to Victoria 
Graham, this soft approach has been the target of local and international speculation 
and criticism, especially in light of Mbeki's stated commitment to the African 
Renaissance and good governance in Africa54. As a result, quiet diplomacy was to be 
conceived as a reactive measure taken by South African (under the leadership of 
President Thabo Mbeki). However, such an approach has become a hugely contested 
debate. As such, the policy has raised a series of concerns, especially among black 
Zimbabweans, in the SADC region, in Africa, and the rest of the world. In general, 
the primary objective of "Quiet Diplomacy" is to create and encourage dialogue 
between MDC and Zanu-PF. In particular, Graham believes that "quiet diplomacy" is 
the opposite of 'loud' diplomacy and as it refers to non-violent measures 3. 
Similarly, the study seeks to ascertain whether the 'Quiet Diplomacy' is viable or not 
given the varied responses that have emerged in regard to it. It is in the context of the 
South African response that the Zimbabwean crisis has attracted international 
attention. In other words, the international community is keen to see how South 
Africa responds to the crisis in Zimbabwe, as the leading force in the sub-continent. 
Also, large numbers of people within Zimbabwe have condemned the policy 
vehemently as being at best, alibi, and at worst, silent on addressing issues. Therefore, 
4 Graham, V. " How firm the handshake? South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 
1999 to 2006", in African Security Review 15.4 Institute for Security Studies, p.l 14 
55 "How firm the handshake? South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006", 
in African Security Review 15.4, Institute for Security Studies, Internet Articles 
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hypothetically, the study states that "'Quiet Diplomacy' is not a viable approach to 
deal with the Zimbabwean crises". 
In addition, the study also has various research objectives that it intends to achieve. 
Such objectives include, amongst other things, an attempt to characterise the 
Zimbabwean crisis, especially during 2000-2008; an attempt to characterise South 
African foreign policy broadly, and towards Zimbabwe; an attempt to determine the 
Strengths of 'Quiet Diplomacy'; an attempt to determine the Weaknesses of 'Quiet 
Diplomacy'; and finally, an attempt to explore alternative policy options. 
In regard to the research methodology and methods, the study will be qualitative. 
Qualitative research includes several approaches to research that are, in some 
respects, quiet different from one another. However, qualitative approaches have two 
things in common. Leedy and Ormrod argue that, first, "they focus on phenomena that 
occur in natural settings- that is, in the real world; and second, they involve studying 
those phenomena in all their complexity'0 . Basically, qualitative approach is 
composed of a variety of methods, namely; ethnography, phenomenological study, 
grounded theory, interviews, and case studies. However, in regard to this study case 
study approach in combination with content analysis will be used. To start with, 
according to Leedy and Ormrod, in a case study "a particular individual, program, or 
event is studied in depth for a defined period of time'07. In this method, researchers 
focus on a single case, perhaps because its unique or exceptional qualities can 
promote understanding or inform practice for similar situations. Thus, in case study, 
the data often involve observations, interviews, documents (newspaper articles, past 
56 Leedy, P.D and Ormrod, J.E, (2001), Practical Research: Planning and Design, New Jersey, p. 147 
Leedy, P.D and Ormrod, J.E, (2001), Practical Research: Planning and Design, New Jersey 
Columbus: Merrill Prentice Hall, p. 149 
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records such as previous test scores)58. Further, data collection includes appropriate 
written documents, while data analysis includes the organization of details about the 
case. For example, the "the specific facts about the case are arranged in a logical 
(chronological) order"59. Leedy further maintains that analyzing a case study data can 
be interpretational, structural, and reflective . Thus, interpretational analysis includes 
examining the data for constructs, themes, and patterns; structural analysis involves 
searching the patterns inherent in discourse, texts, events, or other phenomena; and 
reflective analysis refers to using intuition and judgment to portray or evaluate the 
phenomena61. In regard to the study, structural analysis will be used instrumentally. 
This approach is used as it is assumed that it will provide better understanding about 
the events that have unfolded in Zimbabwe; it will also offer an understanding about 
the program of land reform, and most importantly it will be bounded by time. For 
instance, it will cover a period from 2000 until prior to the 2008 elections. The case of 
Zimbabwe has become known locally, and internationally. However, in my opinion, 
events that are taking place there have not been properly evaluated. 
Another method to be used in this study will be content analysis. It is argued that 
content analysis can be used as a sole methodology or in combination with other 
methodologies . According to Neuman, content analysis is a technique for gathering 
and analyzing the content of the text63. However, Leedy and Ormrod offer a more 
detailed explanation of content analysis. They argue that "content analysis is a 
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detailed and systematic examination of contents of a particular body of material for 
the purpose of identifying patterns, themes, or biases"64. In a content analysis, a 
similar approach is used as in a case study because it is also performed on books, 
newspapers, films, television, art, music, videotapes of human interactions, etc. 
Therefore, these methods have been combined to ensure that they individually and 
collectively provide a better understanding on Zimbabwe. In terms of data collection, 
a similar approach such as interviews, observations, and written documents is used. 
But more importantly, in a content analysis, a data analysis differs slightly because it 
includes recording the frequency of each characteristic; and descriptive or inferential 
statistical analyses may be used to answer the research question63. The Zimbabwean 
economy in particular offers some clear patterns as inflation and economic collapse 
develop at exponential rate. Indeed, in the case of Zimbabwe it appears that not even 
statistical analysis is required to identify correlation between economic collapse and 
deepening political crisis. 
My study will be based solely in the library. The main purpose of the study will be to 
review and analyse recent publications and Internet articles which are based on "quiet 
diplomacy" in relation to Zimbabwe. 
Finally, the structure of the treatise is as follows. Chapter Two deals with the 
theoretical framework that guides and justifies foreign policy. The key theories 
include: realism, institutionalism, and hegemony. Further, the key features of South 
African foreign policy are also dealt with. Key features include national interest and 
the respect for human rights. Chapter Three deals with the Strengths of 'Quiet 
64 Leedy, P.D and Ormrod, J.E, p. 155 
65 Ibid 
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Diplomacy': its logic and its usefulness. In fact, it examines anything that seems to be 
good about "quiet diplomacy" as a policy approach. Conversely, Chapter Four deals 
the Weaknesses of "quiet diplomacy", and it is here that the heart of my case will be 
made against the effectiveness of "quiet diplomacy". Chapter Five deals with 
concluding remarks and recommendations, and it identifies areas that need more 
research, and at the same time, it attempts to make recommendations. 
Given the existence of land reform problem, poverty and unemployment which are 
largely seen as the consequences of land reform, as well as an enduring and deeply 
serious political crisis in Zimbabwe, the study is going to argue that "quiet 
diplomacy" during 2000 to 2008 has not worked. Indeed, if one compares the 
situation in Zimbabwe in 2000 to today, it is clear that the situation has got much 
worse, and it is hard to imagine how "quiet diplomacy" has done anything other than 
to enable Zimbabwe's terminal decline. Given this, the study will argue that other 




Key Features of South African foreign policy since 1994 and the 
Approach to Zimbabwean Crisis 
In order to comprehend the nature and extent of the South African foreign policy, one 
needs to draw a skeletal diagram using the international relations theories as the 
guiding perspectives. Theories normally provide a direction of the study, and help 
identify a gap with which the study intends to address. Three theories will be 
considered in this study, namely, Realism, Institutionalism, and Hegemony. Each of 
these theories will offer an analysis of foreign policy, especially its purpose and goals. 
Theoretical Framework 
REALISM 
Goldstein asserts that "realism" is a school of thought that explains international 
relations in terms of competition for power66. To start with, realism is defined as "an 
approach to international relations that accepts that struggle is an endemic feature of 
life in the international system, either because of the innate imperfectabihty of 
humans or because of the anarchic nature of the international system"67. The realist 
argument is mainly preoccupied with the reasons that make countries to go to war. It 
is widely accepted that this school of thought is mostly dominated by a wide range of 
scholars who differ in many respects. However, common ground is reached with 
regard to power and anarchy as the key contributing factors to war. In the realist 
assessment, power is conceived as the key variable or factor driving state behaviour . 
66 Goldstein, J.S (2003) International Relations, New York: Longman, p.71 
67 Shafritz, J.M, Williams, P. and Calinger, R.S (1993), The Dictionary of20,h century World Politics, 
New York: Henry Holt & Company, p.264 
68 Kolodziej, E.A, p. 129 
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"Power" is often defined as the ability to get another actor to do what it would not 
otherwise have done (or not to do what it would have done)69. Further, Hill defines 
power as a foundational concept of political science and a central pillar of 
International Relations70. The lack of parity in the distribution of power is believed to 
be the skeletal structure of the global order. 
In addition, due to the preponderance of military power possessed by the state, the 
state's material capacity increases thereby constituting its ability to influence not only 
behaviour of other states but the system or balance of power prevailing between 
states71. Also, the international system within which state is embedded allegedly 
induces states to use their leverage over others. As such, the international system is 
anarchical in nature. Weber argues that "the claim that international politics is 
anarchical is almost universally embraced by IR theorists and practitioners . In this 
line of thinking, the anarchy view assumes that international politics is largely 
composed of sovereign nation-states which are beholden to no higher power . 
"Anarchy" refers to the lack of an orderer- someone or something who/which self-
consciously imposes order in a top-down way onto sovereign nation-states74. 
According to Goldstein, "anarchy" is a term that implies not complete chaos or 
absence of structure and rules, but rather the lack of a central government that can 
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enforce rules . On the contrary, Mastanduno posits that states can deal with the 
consequences of anarchy by relying on time-honored instruments such as diplomacy 
69 Goldstein, J.S (2003) International Relations, New York: Longman, p.73 
70 Hill, C. (2003). The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, New York: Palgrave MacMillan 
71 Ibid, p. 130 
'2 Weber, C. (2005). International Relations Theory A Critical Introduction, (2nd). New York: 
Routledge, p. 14 
73 Ibid 
74 Ibid 
75 Goldstein, J.S (2003), International Relations, p.90 
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and the balance of power between blocs of states . This claim, however, generates 
more doubts since realists believe that relations among nation-states are inherently 
competitive. On the one hand, Kolodziej posits that states must develop military 
forces, strategies, alliances, and weapons acquisition policies to sustain and improve 
their competitive position77. Also, Mastanduno posits that states seek power to 
achieve their interests. As a result, it becomes difficult to mitigate the consequences 
of anarchy. Holm and Sorensen argue the principle of "self-help" could be a possible 
remedy to anarchy78. In defining the principle of 'self-help', they argue that "self-help 
is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order"79. 
Finally, the extent of realism is particularly conceived to be elitist and frequently 
antidemocratic. Rothstein prescribes the extremely important criticisms of realism: 
"Realism is implicitly a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned 
with protecting the status quo. Realism has emphasised the necessity of Great 
Powers to maintain their prestige, status, and credibility. Great Powers, are 
compelled to 'prestige polities', that is to say, a form of politics particularly 
difficult to compromise or control"80. 
In terms of the future of realism, Rothstein further maintains that the appeal of realism 
is deceptive and dangerous, for it rests on assumptions about state behaviour which 
have become increasingly irrelevant . The significance of interdependence in areas 
such as economic, social, and cultural matters within the state system obviously 
76 Mastanduno, "A Realist View: three images of the coming international order", in Paul, T.V and 
Hall, J.A (1999), International Order and the Future of World Politics. London: Cambridge University 
Press, p.20 
77 Kolodziej, p. 131 
78 Holm, H and Sorensen, G. "International Relations Theory in a World of Variation", in Whose World 
Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Oxford: Westview Press, p. 188 
79 Ibid 
80 Rothstein, R.L "On the costs of realism", in Little, R and Smith, M, (2006) Perspectives on World 
Politics (3rdEd), New York: Routledge, p.338 
81 Ibid, p.340 
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implies a system in which the autonomy and sovereignty of all the members- great 
and small- is being eroded . 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
The institutionalist view offers a slightly different approach in dealing with foreign 
policy. In fact, liberal theories conceives institutions as having a variety of necessary 
functions and impacts- especially in terms of facilitating co-operation and in altering 
the ways in which states identify and pursue their interests. Clearly, "liberal theories 
have also identified and stressed the importance of institutions among states that serve 
as foundational agreements or constitutional contracts"83. A normative approach is 
offered by scholars who subscribe to this school of thought. An institutionalist 
argument is largely preoccupied with normative accounts and rules that guide the 
behaviour of states. Basically, an institution is "a set of rules that stipulate the ways in 
which states should cooperate and compete with one another"0*. In essence, 
international institutions prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviour, and proscribe 
O f 
unacceptable kinds of behaviour . Scholars who subscribe to this school of thought 
believe that (against popular belief) international system is not anarchic in practice, 
but it has implicit or explicit structure which determines how states will act within the 
international system . 
Ikenberry, G.J "Institutions, strategic restraint, and the persistence of American postwar order", in 
Little, R and Smith, M (2006), Perspectives on World Politics (3rdEd), New York: Routledge, p. 134 
84 Martin, L.L , " An institutionalist view: international institutions and state strategies", in Paul, T.V 




Furthermore, criticisms of institutionalism include: the belief that this school is unable 
to force states to act in ways that are against their interests87. Most importantly, the 
institutionalism argument seems to be solely based on monitoring and mitigating the 
effects of competition, but the criterion that is effective (forcing states to comply) is 
not clearly demonstrated. In other words, no coercive measures are used to ensure 
compliance in the event of disobedience. Further, the theory can be perceived to be 
totally opposing the realist conviction that war is attributed to anarchy. However, 
since there is a lack of balance of power in the international system power is usually 
used to further ones own interests. 
Finally, institutionalists and realists have common agreements and disagreements. For 
instance, institutionalists agree with realists of all stripes that overcoming selfish 
tendencies of states, especially their possession of a monopoly of violence, is a real 
problem88. As such, they agree that this problem can not be ignored simply by 
assuming that the benefits of cooperation are self-evident if states cooperate. They 
disagree in certain instances, for example, institutionalists insist that they are working 
within a "systemic perspective" to achieve a parsimonious explanation of state 
behaviour, but most realists generally reject this claim . Realists mainly attribute war 
to the anarchic system within which states are embedded, but institutionalists believe 
that the international system is not anarchic in practice; rather it has an implicit and 
explicit structure which determines how states will act. 
Wikipedia, Instituttionalism in international relations, in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutiolism in international relations , p.l 
88 Kolodziej, E. A, p., 152 
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HEGEMONY 
Scholars who subscribe to hegemony are of the view that a unipolar system is good in 
terms of bringing international peace and order. Wohlforth defines unipolarity "as a 
structure in which one state's capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced" . By 
contrast, multi-polarity is produced when a structure comprises three or more 
especially powerful states, and a bi-polarity is produced when a structure consists of 
two states that are substantially more powerful91. Goldstein defines hegemony as "the 
holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system, so that it 
can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international 
political and economic relations are conducted"92. Basically hegemony, as defined by 
Robertson, means the domination or rule of one actor over others . Hegemony occurs 
when one country, for example, the United States of America (USA) in the West 
during the Cold War, is massively dominant over other actors in the relevant sphere -
members of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in this case94. Thus, the 
system is hegemonic when the domination of one actor is taken for granted and 
unchallenged by those over whom it holds sway95. Evans and Newnham argued that 
"hegemony is a concept meaning primacy or leadership"96. Normally, such a state is 
called a hegemon97. Within the global world, United States of America (USA) seems 
to hold the hegemonic character even though some research has predicted a slow 
decline. Spence argues that South Africa is also composed of hegemonic character 
90 Wohlforth, W.C "The stability of a unipolar world", in Little, R and Smith, M. (2006), Perspectives 
on World Politics, p.99 
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92 Goldstein, J.S (2003) International Relations, p.99 
Robertson, D. (2002). A Dictionary of Modern Politics, (3rdEd), New York: Europa Publications, 
p.222 
94 Ibid, p.223 
95 Ibid 
Evans, G, and Newnham, J, (1990), The Dictionary of World Politics A Reference Guide to 
Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 153 
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within the SADC region although it has tried to avoid giving offence to its weaker, 
poorer neighbours98. Further, under hegemony stability theory, the hegemon often 
provides common goods to be used by all". 
Analysing South African foreign policy 
It is quite hard to pin down confidently what foreign policy means, and what the key 
aspects or features that underlie the making of it are. Hill defines foreign policy as 
"the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a 
state) in international relations"100. Therefore, policy is the 'sum' of these external 
relations because otherwise every particular action could be seen as a separate foreign 
policy101. Thus, the policy is 'foreign' because the world is still more separated into 
distinctive communities than it is a single, homogenizing entity . Also, more care is 
needed when a policy becomes foreign. This means that a state is expected to enter 
into a community of states because "a state is not a single conscious being; its actions 
are a composite of individual human choices- by its citizenry, its political leaders, its 
diplomats and bureaucrats- aggregated through the state's internal structures"103. 
Foreign policy provides an insight on why states act the way they do toward other 
states. Goldstein defines foreign policy as "the strategies used by governments to 
guide their actions in the international arena"104. Further, foreign policies clarify the 
objectives that state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or 
situations as well as the general means by which they intend to pursue those 
98 Spence, J. "Introduction", in Broederick, and others (2001), South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemmas 
of a New Democracy, New York: Palgrave, p. 19 
Thompson, L (2001) Development, Democracy and Aid in Southern Africa, Bellville: Centre for 
Southern African Studies at the School of Government, University of Western Cape, p. 19 
Hill, C. (2003), The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, New York:Palgrave MacMillan, p.3 
101 Ibid 
102 I b i d 
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objectives105. Foreign policies are generally designed to help protect a country's 
national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity . It 
is challenging to provide a full analysis of foreign policy. This is partly because 
foreign policy is perpetually changing. However, an agreement has been reached on 
three very important general influences on contemporary foreign policy: "the end of 
Cold War; the process of globalisation; and the challenge to the Westphalia state 
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system represented by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention" . 
Certainly, realist argument appears to have strong influence when analysing the South 
African foreign policy- especially during the apartheid era. For example, during this 
time the key intention of the ANC was to improve its military base in the 
neighbouring countries, whereas the apartheid state looked to crush these attempts, 
often through the overt use of military force. The principle of "national interest" as 
zero-sum military conflict appeared to dominate the foreign policy agenda during the 
apartheid108. As a result, power and the competition thereof was the most important 
thing. 
However, since coming to power, the approach of the ANC in their dealings with 
neighbouring countries appears closer to the theory of institutionalism. They formally 
prioritise human rights over and above any other important aspects. They prescribe 
the channels which have to be followed by other SADC countries in order to achieve 
democracy, human rights, and stability. Spence warned that South Africa has 
continued to base its political settlement on co-operative policies in resolving the 
105 Ibid 
106 Wikipedia, Foreign policy available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign policy p.l Accessed on 30 November 2007 
' Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 11 
• Lodge, T, Quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe: a case study of South Africa in Africa, p.l 
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crisis in the Congo and Angola even though they seemed to have clearly damaged the 
prospects for closer integration in the economic and social fields . 
Finally, South Africa is in possession of hegemonic capabilities within the SADC 
region. Yet, it does appear that the government has been careful to take steps to show 
that they do not intend to bully the region. Johnston maintains that South Africa is the 
hegemonic power in the region, but it has tried hard to avoid giving offence to its 
weaker, poorer neighbours110. Further, Zimbabwe is largely reliant on South Africa's 
electricity supplier ESKOM- for its electricity supply111. 
South African foreign policy since 1994 
In order to understand the nature and the intricacy of South African foreign policy, it 
is imperative that the historical character of governance is given some attention. South 
Africa has actually experienced two different contexts in recent times, namely, 
apartheid and democracy. The apartheid context was largely witnessed before 1994. 
In the apartheid context, South Africa's' relations with other countries, and especially 
its immediate neighbours, was hostile. As a result, security concerns dominated the 
agenda of South Africa policy objectives112. Therefore, South Africa policy makers 
devoted much time to exploring military options to protect the country from 
antagonistic states that resented the fact that they had to depend on South Africa for a 
number of essential services . In the process, South Africa used its military 
109 Spence, J. "Introduction", in Broederick, J, Burford, G. and Freer, G. (2001) South Africa's Foreign 
Policy Dilemmas of a New Democracy, New York: Paigrave, p. 8 
110 Johnston, A. "Democracy and Human Rights", in Principles and Practice of South African Foreign 
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superiority to pursue its foreign policy objectives, which aimed at, amongst other 
things, creating instability in the region and preserving white minority rule . 
In the context of democracy, human rights and the belief in justice, and a belief in 
international peace started dominating the agenda of foreign relations. Nelson 
Mandela, the former President of South Africa conceded that: "human rights will be 
the light that guides our foreign relations"115. In fact, the respect for human rights was 
initially presented as the cornerstone for South African foreign policy. For the ANC in 
particular, the struggle against the apartheid system was indeed a struggle for 
fundamental human rights, so that is why the foreign policy places so much emphasis 
on respect for human rights116. 
Conceptually, foreign policy is widely conceived to be an instrument through which a 
country and its government structures conduct relations with the rest of the world-
politically, economically, and socially. In regard to South African foreign policy, 
similar definition could also be applied. However, it has its own unique emphasis on 
particular issues. Unique priorities are taken into cognisance. For instance, Alfred Nzo 
(a former Minister of Foreign Affairs) emphasised that Africa, and especially the 
Southern African region, were top of the policy agenda based on the assumption that 
South Africa could not prosper in isolation, without assisting in the development of 
neighbouring African countries117. Meanwhile, Deputy Foreign Minister (Aziz Pahad) 
has also emphasised South Africa's "Africaness"118. In the context of "Africaness", 
1,4 Ibid 
115 Ibid 
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Pahad expressed the view that South Africa must play a major role in Africa's 
renaissance. 
More importantly, other researchers such as Jack Spence contend that African unity 
and solidarity must be prioritised as the key components in the formulation of South 
African foreign policy. In particular, Spence acknowledged that "any redefinition of 
South Africa's foreign policy must recognise the African continent and the Southern 
African region in particular as a critical focus of interest and influence11 . When 
Nelson Mandela asked about South Africa's position in the global community, he 
responded: 
"The great challenge for our age... is to answer the question, given the 
interdependence of the world, what is it that we can and must do to ensure that 
democracy, peace and prosperity prevail everywhere?"120 
According to Alfred Nzo, Mandela's words had formed the "cornerstone" of South 
Africa's foreign policy and articulated Pretoria's hopes for, and vision of, the 
world121. 
Meanwhile, the old South African foreign policy was mostly aimed at achieving 
"national interest". In this regard, security concerns were a focal point in the debates 
relating to foreign policy objectives. According to Stephen Chan, the term "national 
interest" is used to refer to the preferences of a nation's leaders, or put differently, the 
119 Spence, J. in Broederick, J, and others (2001). South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemmas of a New 
Democracy, New York: Palgrave, p.8 
120 A Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, in the National Assembly, 18 May 1995, 
Policy Guideline by the Minister and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, (1995), Pretoria, p.21 
Shelton, G. and others, South Africa and Australia: New Indian Ocean Partners, Working Paper 
Series by East Asia Project (EAP), p.2 
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goals that are sought by the state . Further, Krasner, "specified that such 
preferences, or set of objectives, must be related to general societal goals, persist over 
time, and have a consistent ranking of importance in order to justify using the 
term"123. Generally, many analysts assume that foreign policy is solely based on 
124 
national interest . 
However, the Post-Cold War South African context seems to differ significantly with 
the account of national interest as a primary objective of any foreign policy. Even 
though the debate on the issue of 'national interest' has led to disagreements on the 
actual definition of the concept, there is a broad acceptance that traditional vital 
interests, for example security concerns, are no longer the key issue on the foreign 
policy agenda in a post-Apartheid and post-Cold War environment 5. In a context of 
new globalised and highly competitive environment, South Africa's foreign economic 
policies are designed to promote domestic economic development, in an effort to 
combat poverty and inequalities in living standards . 
In addition, the post-Apartheid and post-Cold War foreign policy is specially designed 
to grapple with issues pertaining to human rights and democracy. Anthoni van 
Niewkerk prescribed seven principles which were announced by the ANC between 
1993 and 1994, and supposedly they were intended to guide the conduct of South 
Africa's new foreign policy: 
122 Van Niewkerk, A. "South Africa's National Interest", published in African Security Review Vol 13, 
No. 2, 2004, p.l available at: 
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o A belief in and preoccupation with human rights 
o A belief in the promotion of democracy worldwide 
o A belief that justice and international law should guide relations 
between nations 
o A belief that international peace is the goal to which all nations should 
strive 
o A belief that South Africa's foreign policy should reflect the interests 
of Africa 
o A belief that South Africa's economic development depends on 
growing regional and international economic co-operation 
o A belief that South Africa's foreign relations must mirror a deep 
commitment to the consolidation of its democracy . 
By contrast, Johnston argues that South African foreign policy since 1994 has been 
characterised with two things, namely: "transformation", understood in various ways, 
and second that it has been heavily criticised for allegedly lacking coherence and 
consistency128. In fact, the imperative of transformation has two sources: the first one 
is the internal dynamic of democratisation which imposes its own priority and creates 
its own opportunities129. In this regard, democracy is mainly considered within the 
parameters of the state, whether it is growing or not. Thereafter, it enters into a 
community of states. The second is the changing international terrain, on which the 
new political configurations of the post-Cold War world, and the developing patterns 
127 Van Niewkerk, A. "The Lesotho Crisis: Implications for South African Foreign Policy", in 
Lambrechts, K. (1999). Crisis in Lesotho: The Challenge of managing conflict in Southern Africa, 
published by Foundation for Global Dialogue, p. 13 
128 Broederick, and others. (2001). "Democracy and Human Rights in the Principles and Practice of 
South African Foreign Policy", in South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemmas of a New Democracy, p.l 1 
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of social and economic relationships usually described under the rubric of 
'globalisation' make themselves felt130. Despite all criticisms, Johnston concedes that 
the new South African foreign policy shows a great deal of commitment to the 
promotion of human rights1''1. He firmly believes that human rights are the 
international currency of democracy. Finally, in the post-Cold War democratic 
governments have to find formulae for addressing international human rights issues. 
Furthermore, the status and prestige of South Africa as the champion of human rights 
and democracy in SADC region is changing, possibly, because there are critics that 
have emerged. Mostly, critics have questioned the moral standard of South Africa's 
foreign policy. Critics say "why, for instance, was Pretoria quick to restore relations 
Libya, a non-democratic country?" . Also, South Africa endorsed the outcome of 
the Zimbabwe elections even though Zanu-PF supporters allegedly violated human 
rights. Thus, South Africa is confronted with a dilemma of pursuing foreign policy 
goals which clash with the practices of some other African states133. 
However, it is critically important to assess "quiet diplomacy" as the approach 
towards Zimbabwe in great detail. Thus, the following chapter on the strengths of 
"quiet diplomacy" will provide a meaningful and a fairly impartial assessment of 
"quiet diplomacy" particularly its strengths. It is in this chapter where the 
achievements of "quiet diplomacy" will be spelt out. Essentially, the following 
chapter offers a positive account of "quiet diplomacy". 




Strengths of "Quiet Diplomacy" 
Of all the possible policy frameworks the South African government, in particular the 
Mbeki administration, has opted for the so-called "quiet diplomacy" in response to the 
Zimbabwean crisis. Indeed, "quiet diplomacy" is essentially an attempt to encourage 
and emphasise the significance of dialogue between the Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition.lj4. It is also a form of 
traditional diplomacy involving elite acting behind closed doors, out of the glare of 
publicity. This Chapter will begin by outlining what "Quiet Diplomacy" is. Secondly, 
it will outline the reasons regarding the selection of this policy. Finally, and most 
importantly, it will outline the strengths of "quiet diplomacy". 
Firstly, the above chapter on the foreign policy of South Africa has shown that South 
African foreign policy is mainly intended towards the promotion of peace and security 
(entailing the strengthening of conflict prevention and resolution capabilities of the 
region and rendering assistance in monitoring and addressing issues that affect 
regional stability)135. Other goals of foreign policy include: the promotion of 
democratisation and human rights136. Thus, Mbeki administration committed itself to 
fighting against human rights abuses. Arguably, the most difficult human rights 
challenge since 1994 has been with the gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe 
following with the failure of land reform programme. In its intervention, the Mbeki 
administration had used "Quiet Diplomacy" as the policy framework to deal with the 
Sachikonye, L.M. South Africa's quiet diplomacy: the case of Zimbabwe: available at 
www.hsrc.ac.za p.570 
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crisis. From the outset, "quiet diplomacy" has relied strongly on talks and dialogue 
especially between the ruling party (ZANU-PF) and the opposition party (MDC). 
Quiet diplomacy is not a well-written policy, but it is mainly guided by talks. The 
policy actually expressed the idea that the Zimbabweans should decide amongst 
themselves about the issues they face without anyone interfering in their own internal 
matters. In this regard, the South African approach has seemed to comply with the 
provisions of the international law - especially a law regarding the respect of 
sovereignty. Traditionally, sovereignty is the supreme legal authority of the nation to 
give and enforce the law within a certain territory and, in consequence, independence 
from the authority of any other nation and equality with it under international law . 
Therefore, "quiet diplomacy" is a policy that was used to respect Zimbabwe as a 
sovereign state. 
Secondly, one could perhaps ask what "quiet diplomacy" really means? Generally, the 
approach is conceived to be mainly soft and not coercive for that matter. Graham 
states that: 
"The concept of 'quiet diplomacy', which has progressively become the bon 
mot of international relations, is a loose term, which is potentially problematic 
because as such it is bandied about reference to many kinds of 'soft' 
diplomatic approaches"138. 
The supporters of the policy included former president Nelson Mandela who backed a 
quiet diplomatic approach to Zimbabwe. In an interview with BBC Radio, he argued 
that "an approach through diplomatic channels without much publicity is more likely 
137 Keohane, R.O. "Hobbe's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in 
International Society", in Holm and Sorensen, Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End 
of the Cold War, Oxford: Westview Press, 172 
138 Graham, G "How firm the handshake? South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 
1999 to 2006", in African Security Review 15.4 Institute for Security Studies, pi 15 
to bring about a positive result . In fact, the major principle behind "quiet 
diplomacy" is that it should be quiet. To achieve this, it should take place away from 
critical public and media scrutiny. According to Kagwanja, "quiet diplomacy" as a 
policy was underpinned by the imperatives of African solidarity and peer pressure 
rather than 'megaphone diplomacy' and open criticism of illiberal policies . Further, 
the South African government has opted for "quiet diplomacy" partly because if it 
used its economic leverage, the Zimbabwean situation would have been worsened. 
This is so because Zimbabwe is heavily dependent on South Africa in terms of 
electricity supply. Further, the negative consequence of such action would have been 
felt by innocent, poor Zimbabweans, not President Robert Mugabe. It is mainly the 
people at grassroots level who would suffer the consequences of either economic or 
any other form of sanction. 
Accordingly, Graham provides the grounds/reasons regarding the selection of "quiet 
diplomacy" as a policy to deal with Zimbabwe: 
First, she thinks that a very important reason for South Africa's lack of effective 
action against its neighbour is rooted in historical ties, since the ANC was a former 
liberation movement supported by frontline states throughout their struggle; it stands 
to reason that the ANC has a large debt to repay141. In this regard, she thinks that the 
ANC feels it cannot turn its back on Mugabe and Zanu-PF, which it refers to as its 
"sister party", since both the ANC and ZANU-PF fought colonialism and oppression 
in their respective countries. 
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Second, particular political figures have agreed that the principal objective of South 
Africa's soft approach has been to try to avoid a complete collapse of authority in 
Zimbabwe142. Mbeki asserts that "we cannot afford a complete breakdown. I don't 
know how we would cope with it"143. The hard approach would, therefore, worsen the 
situation even more. The already impoverished people would be forced to die without 
any form of assistance or whatsoever. The complete breakdown means that the 
government would not be able to function effectively, and an already impoverished 
population would be even worse off. 
Third, the new South Africa is still trying to gain acceptance as a genuine African 
country. In fact, this attitude was perpetuated by South Africa's handling of the 
Nigerian crisis in 1995 when it was accused of not being 'African enough' and for 
acting like a bully on the continent144. Therefore, if the ANC-led government had 
threatened Mugabe's government with punitive measures, other regional 
elites/authoritarian leaders would have been furious145. Relatedly, Dlamini-Zuma has 
insisted that "quiet diplomacy" is an inherently African form of foreign relations. She 
also asserted that she will never condemn Mugabe's regime. 
Fourth, due to Africanist diplomacy that exists throughout the continent, South Africa 
has suddenly become a "puppet of the West" and traitor to the "struggle". The logical 
implication of this discourse is that (elite) black solidarity, brotherhood, and support 





for former comrades in arms take precedence over the need to ensure freedom, rule of 
law and respect for human rights . 
Finally, Mbeki's preference has always been motivated by an intra-African approach 
to Zimbabwe147. While the rest of the world remains flabbergasted over South 
Africa's response to the crisis, Mbeki wants the international community to leave it to 
the African Union (AU) and SADC to resolve it in "the African way"148. 
In respect of the case for "quiet diplomacy", Tom Lodge provides a significant 
justification for not using economic leverage against Zimbabwe. He notes "one 
justification for not using the economic leverage that is sometimes cited in defence of 
the South African position is that refusing Zimbabwe economic support might bring 
about a simultaneous political and economic collapse"149. The economic collapse in 
Zimbabwe is mainly witnessed by high unemployment, high inflation, and poverty. In 
addition, the Centre for Policy Studies director Chris Landsberg asserted that "a 
policy based on force will aggravate an already unmanageable situation and hasten a 
meltdown"15 . As far as Britain and other viewers are concerned, a collapsed 
Zimbabwean state would have rebounded on Pretoria with disastrous effect via mass 
influx of refugees, disrupted trade links, and generalised chaos on the borders. 
Kagwanja also share similar sentiments with Lodge. He maintains that the policy has 
146 Ibid 
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Lodge, T Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe: a case study South Africa in Africa, Electronic Version, 
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sacrificed democracy at the altar of stability and, particularly, of Pretoria's intense 
fear of having a failed state on its doorstep . 
The point however, is that it appears as if Zimbabwe is already that failed state. Given 
the current parlous state of the Zimbabwean economy it is hard to imagine how it 
could decline much further even should Mugabe refuse to step down. Further, the 
collapse of political legitimacy and state capacity for much other terrorising the 
population is severely limited. In nutshell, it seems that precisely the disastrous 
outcome of "quiet diplomacy" was intended to avoid has transpired. The policy has 
failed. 
Another factor that explains South African dealings with Zimbabwe are the Africanist 
goals of Thabo Mbeki's foreign policy. Since 1999, the South African foreign policy 
has been based on reconstruction and reform of African continental institutions in 
such a fashion that they in turn can help to foster regional forms of economic 
collaboration and institutional renovation and democratisation at national level15 . In 
fact, huge and tremendous inroads have been made in this regard. For instance, these 
include donor support for the New African partnership for Development's Africa 
Action plan - in 2002 G8 pledges represented more than $20 billion of "new money" 
for the continent153. 
Furthermore, other supporters of "quiet diplomacy" including the International Crisis 
Group believe that Mugabe government is at the heart of the crisis in Zimbabwe. 
Kagwanja, P South Africa: Breathing New Life into "Quiet Diplomacy", Pretoria: Centre for 
International Political Studies, Electronic Briefing Paper, p.2 
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They maintain that "responsibility lies with President Robert Mugabe's government, 
which has mismanaged the economy, institutionalised state violence, and moved 
further toward autocratic rule"134. Consequently, it is only the talks organised by the 
ANC between the ZANU-PF and MDC which could be regarded as the achievement 
of "quiet diplomacy". However, Lodge maintains that both parties were not in a 
position to describe these meetings as negotiations153. He went on to say that "their 
meetings, though, are perhaps the only positive consequence that the South Africans 
can claim from "constructive diplomacy" unless they count the occasional signal of 
residual judicial independence"156. 
It is, however, quite significant to have an objective and neutral view on quiet 
diplomacy. In fact, this chapter has identified the reasons behind "quiet diplomacy", 
and made only a passing assessment of the effectiveness of "quiet diplomacy". These 
will be explored more thoroughly in the following chapter. 
' International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a Way Forward, Africa Report No.32 13 
July 2001, p. 1 available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1483&l=l 




Weaknesses of "Quiet Diplomacy" 
A great deal of criticism and concern has been raised following the use of "Quiet 
Diplomacy" as the policy framework for dealing with the Zimbabwean crisis. Critics 
have rightfully pointed out that the policy is largely silent on poor and tyrannical 
governance and does not require any radical change from Mugabe's government. 
Concerns have also been raised that the situation has actually worsened following the 
use of "quiet diplomacy". Therefore, this Chapter will offer an assessment of the 
performance of "quiet diplomacy" and an assessment of the reasons for its failure. 
Quiet Diplomacy is the target of local, international speculation and criticism, 
especially in light of Mbeki's stated commitment to the African Renaissance and good 
governance in Africa. Similarly, Mbeki's policy in regard to Zimbabwe has been 
vehemently criticised and even referred to as a 'non-policy' since it is "non-verifiable, 
non-specific, has no clear or given objectives or deliverables" . The policy assumes 
that Mugabe, who has persistently ignored basic principles of democracy and rule of 
law, will be influenced by a soft diplomatic approach to change. Domestically, the 
independent media has consistently and strongly criticised the Mbeki government for 
its apparent inability to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis158. 
Secondly, the approach has received various degrees of condemnation including 
media reports which believe that the ANC-led government should renounce her stance 
towards Zimbabwe. The ANC along with other advocates of the policy including the 
157 Graham, V. "How firm the handshake? South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 
1999 to 2006", in African Security Review 15.4 p. 116 
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for the record, of ordinary Zimbabweans. It seems clear that a concern to build 
African solidarity has pushed South Africa into a more cautious direction in openly 
confronting abusive regimes. As noted above, this was Mandela's experience when 
criticising the Nigerian government in 1995. Further, given Mbeki's commitment to 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), "South Africa can not afford to 
be shunned by the rest of the continent"177. This is so because it seems to be leading 
the entire continent in terms of advocating for changes in the continent. In other 
words, African solidarity has been given more weight than respect for good 
governance principles. 
While part of the reason South Africa did not use economic leverage was the hurt this 
might cause to ordinary Zimbabweans, it is clear now that this can no longer be a 
significant factor. With inflation at 1000 000%, unemployment over 80%, and half of 
the population in exile, ordinary Zimbabweans are hurting. Perhaps if South Africa 
has intervened more decisively earlier on this might have been prevented. 
Moreover, it looks as though Mbeki has ended up enabling a rogue regime to continue 
its rule. As Graham notes, the international community has expected South Africa to 
assume the lead role in dealing with Mugabe, given its vast moral authority and its 
considerable economic power in the region178, and has taken its lead from Mbeki. 
Hence, the greater significance of South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe, all of 
which heightens the failure of "quiet diplomacy". 
Graham, V. "How firm the handshake: South Africa's use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 
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The significance of ideology and values is also reflected in the fact that South Africa 
convened several meetings in an attempt to acquaint Robert Mugabe with the norms, 
rules, and guidelines which govern countries in the SADC region. In those meetings, 
however, Mugabe was not prepared to listen. In return, South Africa did not force him 
to comply. This reveals that the international approach can serve to advance 
cooperation but it is not clear how you enforce norms. Ideally, there are international 
regimes that prescribe the norms (acceptable standards of behaviour) that should be 
followed by states, but it is also problematic when it comes to making sure that it is 
achievable. 
In many ways the failure of "quiet diplomacy" is tied up in the futility of trying to 
persuade Mugabe to change his ways. In this respect Mbeki's efforts at "quiet 
diplomacy" with Mugabe strongly echoes the failures of Chamberlain's 
"appeasement" strategy with Hitler. Despite meeting repeatedly with Mugabe, Mbeki 
has been confronted with a leader who either reneges on his promises or denies that 
he ever made them in the first place179. 
But perhaps the judgement is too harsh, for as Graham notes, "South Africa does not 
view any other alternative to quiet diplomacy as being viable"180. The concerns at 
more confrontational tactics would have made things worse much faster has some 
merit, but given the tragic situation that has unfolded anyway, perhaps the prudent 
and the morally courageous thing to do would have been to intervene more assertively 
earlier. In this respect it is notably that Mbeki's insistence on "quiet diplomacy" has 
actually ruined his credibility. According to Graham, Mbeki has ignored views and 
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advices from respected public figures such as Desmond Tutu, and the former 
1 81 
President of the country Nelson Mandela . 
If not "quiet diplomacy", then what should be done? It is recommended that if 
sanctions are adopted and implemented, they should merely target particular 
individuals rather than the country blanketly. In other words, it should only target 
Robert Mugabe, his group of Zanu-PF leaders, not everyone. However, this is quite 
difficult because it is not easy to differentiate between ZANU-PF and MDC 
supporters. This paper also makes a recommendation that the imposition of "smart" 
sanctions by United Nations (UN) in consultation with the United States (US) could 
have made significant inroads because it was only intended to deal with Mugabe and 
his cronies. In fact, this freezing of their bank accounts, and travel bans could have a 
direct impact on them. This is so because it is a technical and selective way that 
would not affect the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. 
Meanwhile, in order for South Africa to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis, it is 
recommended that it should also apply conditionality concerning at least economic 
reform to the credit line it proposes to extend to Zimbabwe and require a monitoring 
mechanism so it can assure itself that the conditions are being met and the money is 
being used for the intended purposes182. 
Finally, the volatile situation in Zimbabwe continues to occur, and this is further 
witnessed by the series of arrests of the opposition leader, and his supporters in 
preparation for the run off of the presidential election. Perhaps, South Africa in 
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partnership with AU, SADC and other institutions should send more mission 
observers to ensure that the election is free and fair. However, what are also more 
disturbing are Mbeki's claims that there are no crisis in Zimbabwe. Still, the MDC has 
decided not to participate in the re-run of presidential elections (scheduled for 27 June 
2008) due to the arrest and intimidation of its leaders. This also proves that there are 
crisis in Zimbabwe which needs to be resolved even though Mbeki denies it. I think 
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